1. Overview of regulatory issues 1.1 Introduction 1.2 Structural issues 1.3 Regulation of natural monopolies 1.4 Promoting competition by pricing access 1.5 Competition policy 1.6 Universal service 2. The rent extraction-efficiency trade-off 2.1 Introduction 2.2 A simple model of regulation 2.3 Optimal regulation and the characteristics of developing countries 2.4 The rent extraction-efficiency trade in practice 3. A positive theory of privatization 3.1 Introduction 3.2 Literature review 3.3 The model 3.4 Privatization 3.5 Testing the theory 4. Enforcement, regulation, and development 4.1 Introduction 4.2 Optimal regulation 4.3 Regulation and enforcement 4.4 Predictions of the model 5. Acess pricing relues for developing countries 5.1 Introduction 5.2 About the optimality of the market structure 5.3 Structural separation and pricing of acess to an independently owned infrastructure 5.4 One-way access with vertical integration 5.5 Two-way access 6. Universal service obligations in LDCs 6.1 Introduction 6.2 The basic setting 6.3 Optimal regulation under price discrimination 6.4 Optimal regulation under uniform pricing 6.5 Universal service policy under collusion 7. Desing of regulatory institutions in developing countries 7.1 Introduction 7.2 Lessons from history in industrialized countries 7.3 Organization theory 7.4 Experiences in industrialized countries 7.5 Experiences in Latin America 8. Separation of regulatory powers and development 8.1 Introduction 8.2 The model 8.3 Duplication of informative signals and benevolent regulation 8.4 Optimal regulation with a single regulator 8.5 Optimal regulation with two regulations 8.6 Separation of powers in developing countries 8.7 Implementing separation of powers 8.8 Separation of powers as an endogenous institution 9. Concluding remarks 9.1 A more general model 9.2 Empirical validation 9.3 Policy implications